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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
Over the coming 11-17 months (until end 2021), governments around the world are faced with 
the four options of (I) continuing the lockdown until a vaccine is found (estimated at 11-17 
months from now), (II) periodic suspension of lockdown measures and their re-imposition until 
then, (III) a partial suspension of lockdown measures, and (IV) end of all lockdown measures.  
We estimate that (I) would have unaffordable economic consequences.  (II) might be the 
optimal balance between the most humane treatment of the illness on the one hand 
(hospitalisation of all needing medical attention) and economic cost, but the economic costs 
would still be high, and could only be borne with most effective use of opening periods.  Given 
supply chains and interconnectedness with the economies of other countries, this would work 
effectively only if very closely harmonised with those other countries’ own lockdown periods.  
(III) would be economically more desirable but would lead to more cases needing 
hospitalisation than the NHS can cope with.  Even this option would be economically more 
sustainable with close trading and other co-operation with EU countries.  (IV) is unacceptable 
in terms of human suffering caused to infected populations, with the NHS being completely 
overwhelmed several times over and fatalities in UK alone well into six figures.   
The prospects of the fiscal and economic recovery of the UK from 2022 depend very much on 
which of the above options are chosen now and in the coming 6 weeks.  Everything else – 
Britain continuing to take a leading role in the world politically, economically, in defence and 
security – will flow from that.  We sketch three possible resulting scenarios, each of which 
would set the UK on different courses in the recovery period after the immediate pandemic 
period. 
 
1  with contributions and input from Professor Massimo Palmarini, Dr Neil Munro, Dr Husein 
Aliyev, Dr Marcin Kaczmarski, Johan Norberg, Nicholas Myers, Pelayo Fernández, Jennifer 
Russi and Jacopo Grande 
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While studies are underway to forecast developments after a vaccine for COVID-19 is applied, 
this study attempts to unpack the Black Box of the immediate crisis months until a vaccine 
effectively puts an end to the pandemic.   
In spite of the retreat to national interests that the Covid-19 pandemic has initially provoked 
globally, the UK government’s decisions on how to deal with the resultant crisis in the coming 
12-20 months has to take into account developments outside the UK.  National efforts to 
control it will depend on tightening or loosening policies elsewhere, and on a steady supply of 
food and other essential commodities from outside the UK.  The UK is and will be affected by 
the effects the pandemic itself and other governments’ behaviour is having on the international 
stock markets, and by socio-political instability that might result in some regions near Europe 
or domestically in some major world players.  
As a starting point for our analysis, we have identified four different courses of action among 
which governments of all states of the world have to choose.  All four consist of some sort of 
balance between financial and economic costs to the state and the number of lives that might 
be saved, ranging from a strong preponderance on one side to a strong weighting of the 
extreme opposite.  While all four options are theoretically available to all state governments, 
our very rough estimates suggest that hardly any country could afford Option I, and many 
countries, especially in the developing economies, cannot afford even the middle Options II 
and III.  Thus different states will espouse different options; in other words, the individual 
options will not result in four neatly distinguishable scenarios.  Nevertheless, we shall the 
different tracks on which world events could be set by the end of 2021, with all the implications 
this would have for the UK.   
 
Assumptions: 
Pharmaceutical solutions:  
The best case scenario would be if pharmaceutical solutions could be found.  One being 
explored is the mitigation of the illness with existing medicines; another is that of harvesting 
plasma including antibodies harvested from recovered patients (or synthesised antibodies) 
can successfully cure the disease.2  In a best-case scenario, these could begin to be applied 
in the summer of 2020.  A vaccine is not expected before 11-17 month’s from writing.  In our 
estimates below, we will stick to the worst case scenario of having to wait for a vaccine, with 
none of the former two possibilities materialising. 
 
Non-pharmaceutical solutions 
In the absence of pharmaceutical solutions being found sooner to eliminate or mitigate the 
effects of the virus, According to Imperial College London Covid-19 Response Group (see 
graph below), the only alternative to continued suppression (keeping in lockdown) and letting 
 
2  Hervé Morin: « Un essai clinique sur le plasma sanguin débute en France », Le Monde (11 
April 2020) 
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the pandemic eat through the population until herd immunity is established would be: short 
periods of lifting the shut-down, always followed by a re-imposition of the shut-down, until a 
vaccine is found.  Only this, the Imperial College Response Team argue, can prevent the 
health service from breaking down.  Any relaxation of the lockdown measures, they say, will 
lead to a resumption of infections.  Writing in mid-March 2020, they used Nov 2021 as end 
date, as that +18 months for production of vaccine (estimated as +12-18 months).  From this 
we conclude that there are the following Options (for governments of all states): 
I. Keep lockdown in place until the vaccine is found. 
II. Go for a periodic lock-down as in the ICL table above, with restrictions loosened at 
different times in different regions of a country, so that hospitals can help each other 
across regional boundaries if necessary. 
III. Keep partial lockdown in place (e.g. self-isolation of vulnerable people, no travel 
abroad on vacation, universities stay shut) until vaccine is found.   
IV. Abandon lockdown as all forms I.-III. above are unaffordable, keep up self-isolation of 
vulnerable people, hope for herd immunity. 
 
 
Balancing Costs 
The cost to society of the lockdown(s) – unemployment, businesses losing income and even 
going bankrupt, loss of schooling and further education for young people – has to be balanced 
against the cost in terms of fatalities if there are no lockdowns.  Absent lockdown a new wave 
of morbidity and mortality will arrive.  While fatalities are particularly concentrated on older age 
groups, younger people also die, and not only when they are already suffering from other 
health problems.  Finding the right balance is complicated by the fact that, even weighing only 
issues of health and fatalities, there is likely a ‘tipping point’ where one less bad outcome (a 
‘flattened curve’ through social distancing) becomes two bad outcomes (deaths from COVID-
19 + health issues from other causes related to or exacerbated by the lockdown).   
From a certain point, lockdowns may start to send more people to overstretched hospitals for 
health problems other than COVID-19 infections: breakdowns in mental health, poor 
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supervision of their medication, domestic violence.  Meanwhile, the one-year backlog in non-
essential operations that already exists will be pushed out by another year, and even now 
there are reports that the NHS is suspending cancer treatments.  As the Institute of Fiscal 
Studies has put it, a “debate has started on whether the adverse health effects of a recession 
may be greater than the increased morbidity and mortality within the pandemic itself.”  The 
NHS has been shown to be much shorter of beds per capita than most old EU health services.   
It’s hard to say when these points will be reached – after 6 week’s lockdown, 3 months’ 
lockdown, after 12 months’ on-and-off lockdowns?  But either way, moves to reduce pressure 
on health systems may eventually put pressure on health systems in a different guise. In 
several countries, lockdowns are suspended “for the sake of the economy”, while many severe 
restrictions are kept in place.  This is perhaps the wrong way to think about it.  It may be also 
“for the sake of those not yet infected”.  We may be at a point soon face a significantly 
increased death rate in 2020 and 2021 one way or the other, only partly caused by COVID-
19, with mortality from other causes increased due to deferred operations and suspended 
treatments (in the UK this includes cancer treatment!) in overstretched healthcare systems. 
For developing countries, the picture is likely to be bleaker still: no lockdown would result in 
massive fatalities in societies where people live in very restricted quarters, especially where 
tropical climates have engendered a lifestyle which is in good part outdoors.  Lockdown, in the 
absence of social welfare provisions for the unemployed, will lead to extreme impoverishment 
with entire families losing their income, and in some countries it can easily lead to starvation, 
not to mention to the spread of other diseases which cannot be adequately met alongside 
COVID-19. 
 
Options for UK Government: 
Option I: Keep lockdown in place until the vaccine is found 
Keep lockdown in place until the vaccine is found (“putting lives above the economy”, doing 
“whatever it will take”) is in all likelihood unaffordable, especially given the short- and medium-
term economic consequences of Brexit that have begun in 2016. All assumptions of economic 
growth are, at present, based on a smooth transition period up to December 2020. COVID-19 
means that growth forecasts globally for the UK are currently being downgraded with latest 
estimates before the complete lockdown suggesting growth rates for 2020 of around 0.9% 
(OECD) compared to the IMF forecast of 1.4% at the start of the year.  Even this seems utterly 
over-optimistic: if global trade diminishes by anything like the proportion predicted, we are 
facing severe and prolonged recession. 
 
Option II: Stop-and-go: periodic lockdown and lifting of lockdown 
A periodic lock-down and re-opening as in the ICL figure above, possibly with restrictions 
loosened at different times in different UK regions, so that hospitals can help each other across 
regional boundaries if necessary.  This is likely to be the second-most costly option in terms 
of government expenditure, losses to business and high unemployment.   
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Not all businesses would be able to adapt to this pattern and stay productive and ultimately 
survive, but planning for periodic closures in the coming 11-17 months with clear dates given 
by May or June 2020 at the latest would help many prepare and secure supplies and plan for 
effective distribution.  The pattern would take getting used to and be disagreeable for 
everybody, and even with this Option, many businesses would be unable to survive.  But it 
would be very much easier to bear than a total lockdown from now until 2021.  Some sectors 
– agriculture – would have to be excluded from closures, at least until the harvest season.  For 
the tertiary education sector, it would bring no substantial advantages; the prospect for foreign 
students of coming to UK, having a week here and there of face-to-face contact and then 
sitting in expensive university accommodation for most of the year, without access to labs and 
perhaps even without access to libraries, is hardly worth the high fees.  UK universities would 
de facto turn into Open University clones, at least for the coming academic year.  Added to 
Brexit, this might permanently burst the bubble of the UK tertiary education sector.   
The effects on the UK government’s budget are already marked. Projections in early March 
were for total government expenditure to be £928bn as a result of the Coronavirus measures 
undertaken in the budget. By the end of March it was estimated that the additional budget 
measures could add as much as £100bn to public debt in 2020. Yet even this may be 
insufficient to counter the 44% drop in new case registrations announced in March 2020,  a 
threatened collapse of the airline sector (reportedly with resources to last to the end of May) 
and the threat to key sectors of employment such as hospitality and catering. Moreover, the 
WTO argues that global trade could fall by as much as 32% in 2020. Trade represents over 
60% the UK’s GDP thus the country is likely to be severely impacted by any drop in global 
trade. Estimates of the total impact on GDP vary, but the OECD’s comparative analysis 
suggests that the impact on the UK will be around -25% putting the economy in the top quartile 
of affected countries.  
Estimates as of 8 April were that the Job Retention Scheme announced for the lockdown now 
will cost £ 30-40 bn over the 3 months for which the government has initially promised this 
support.  But if further periods of lockdown are envisaged, the loss just for this expenditure 
over the time until the vaccine would easily rise to £ 100 bn.  In addition, the cost for supporting 
businesses (including transport – from ferry services and Eurotunnel for vital supplies from the 
Continent to rail, coach and bus travel to airlines) would dwarf the current government SME 
support measures through guarantees which are estimated to be around £350bn. 
The large-scale government subsidies designed to make up negative output of the economy 
and slowing demand will massively increase state debts.  During the crisis, UK expenditure 
on healthcare, budgeted at £162 bn for Fiscal Year 2019-2020, will be very much higher, but 
after the end of the crisis, the expenditure cannot be reduced to 2019 levels.  Given the already 
existing backlog of treatments by the NHS, it will continue to need about twice the funding of 
previous years even after a vaccine has been found.   
At the same time, as the UK prides itself on its low-tax economy, its tax revenue and public 
spending per capita are relatively smaller than that of several of its EU neighbours: the UK 
Government would have the option to raise higher taxes in coming years to make up for the 
losses, and to resume austerity measures on a scale that would in turn have great knock-on 
effects in terms of poverty and even inadequate health provisions.  This would offset any 
medium- and longer-term gains which the UK Government is hoping to reap from Brexit.  The 
consequences for the UK’s long-standing productivity gap with Germany, France and the US 
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are hard to gauge, not least because of the dominance of the service sector in UK GDP.  
However, in the near term productivity is likely to fall and any longer term growth will be a 
function of the extent to which the labour market and production adapt to new technology-
based ways of working post-crisis.  It is difficult to imagine that defence procurement decisions 
would not be put off or that commitments already made would not be delayed if at all possible.   
The British public is currently not psychologically prepared for this option, which means it 
would encounter more resistance if sprung upon it suddenly than if it were prepared and dates 
were announced for future lockdowns well into 2021 so that businesses, schools and 
administrations can plan around them. 
 
Option III: Partial lockdown until vaccine is found, enabling large sectors to 
resume productivity 
Keep partial lockdown in place.  This should probably include the prohibition of larger 
accumulations of people, i.e. no entertainment events from sport to cinema, concerts, theatre, 
opera; museums, zoos and fun-parks would remain closed.  The self-isolation of vulnerable 
people and social distancing would be encouraged not enforced, travel abroad on vacation 
would be curtailed, universities would stay shut and revert to distance learning for all of 
Academic Year 2020-2021, but most other businesses – probably excluding gastronomy and 
hospitality – open up again) until a vaccine is found.  This would prima facie seem cheaper 
than Option I and more easily implementable than Option II in terms of government subsidies 
and more productive for industry and businesses (albeit not the higher education and sports, 
entertainment, gastronomy and tourist sectors), and entail less unemployment, but would go 
along with a high risk of numbers of infections exceeding NHS capabilities.  Without 
pharmaceutical break-throughs, this option might have to be abandoned in favour of Option II.  
In addition, French epidemiologists, drawing on the success of Taiwan, Japan, Germany and 
other countries, have concluded that  
Extensive case-finding, testing and isolation are required to envision social 
distancing strategies that gradually relax current constraints (larger fraction of 
individuals going back to work, progressive reopening of activities), while keeping 
schools closed and seniors isolated. …  Extensive case-finding and isolation would 
allow the partial release of the socio-economic pressure caused by extreme 
measures, while avoiding healthcare demand exceeding capacity. Response 
planning needs to urgently prioritize the logistics and capacity for these 
interventions. 
This has also been advocated by the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina, and 
both the French and German governments are now imposing this measure.  
On the up side, given current government subsidies, many businesses may bounce back if 
they could resume work fully or largely from mid-2020.  But factoring in the effects of Brexit 
and the small likelihood of a smooth transition to full detachment, on 1 January 2021, even in 
this context, the economic climate would be strained. Much would depend on how many small 
businesses do remain solvent, the extent to which they can continue to trade domestically and 
internationally and, of course, the rate at which they re-employ furloughed staff. This will be 
determined by the numbers of businesses that can access loans and, perhaps more 
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importantly, have an appetite to access loans in an economic climate that is already uncertain 
and is now unpredictable. 
On the down side, according to current epidemiological estimates, absent another lockdown, 
the inevitable new wave of infections will still overwhelm NHS capacities.  The lockdown that 
began in late March has merely have flattened the curve of the first wave to stay within the 
limits in which the NHS could cope and delayed a second big wave with which it would not.  
Even if in the meantime, more PPE, ventilators and tests for health workers and carers are 
been acquired, and even after new emergency hospitals like the Nightingale Hospital come 
into service, cases requiring hospitalisation in the UK will exceed available NHS facilities.  
Fatalities might well still exceed 100 000 for UK alone by the end of 2020.   
 
Acceleration of previous trends 
Always assuming that severe restrictive measures will stay in place at least a year in all, in 
Options I., II., and III., a series of changes that had been underway well before will be catalysed 
to accelerate or become preponderant and lasting, while without this crisis they might not have 
done so.  For example, IT has made it possible for people in many professions to work from 
home at least some of the time, and yet there was a strong cultural resistance to this in most 
countries.  This cultural-psychological barrier is likely to be overcome now if people are forced 
to get used to this way of working.  Without the lockdown, the old cultural barriers would likely 
have persisted for many years yet.  The extent to which these lasting changes occur will be 
much greater Options I or II are chosen, and if no pharmaceutical relief is found until late 2021.  
If Options I or II prevail until summer 2021, a whole set of procedures in many sectors will 
have been suspended, changed and replaced irreversibly, where previously there was 
resistance to such change.  Acceleration and catalysation of such changes will result in a 
world that functions substantially differently and thus looks different from that of 1 January 
2020.   
Changes are likely to include: 
1. Large numbers of small businesses collapsing. The ONS estimates there are around 5.9m 
businesses in the UK accounting for some 99% of all businesses, 3/5ths of employment 
and around a half of all business turnover. If, as is currently assumed, 1/5th of these go out 
of business, then this impacts not just on GDP but also livelihoods of a large proportion of 
the workforce, many of whom could be on contracts, or indeed zero-hour contracts. 
2. Larger businesses may use this as an excuse to go for the automation of a proportion of 
routine middle management roles (Industrie 4.0) and will not reemploy people as a result. 
The consequences for the labour market will be to accelerate a shift towards greater 
automation with the commensurate social impact of increased leisure time alongside 
permanently lower wages. 
3. Impact on government budgets, which will not be mainly the actual cost of additional 
unemployment benefits, but the dependence on rates at which demand picks up 
subsequently. If it does not pick up after an extended crisis (up to mid- or end of 2021), 
then we might return to the 1970’s in terms of government deficit and the prospect of the 
need for an IMF bailout cannot be excluded. This could well be worsened by a bumpy 
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transition out of the EU (and a smooth transition under current circumstances seems as 
unlikely with negotiations put off).  
4. Macroeconomic orthodoxy would suggest that a fiscal boost at present will protect levels 
of demand in the economy and allow businesses to survive. The longer-term danger is 
that without a careful strategic approach to economic management, the likely rise in 
inflation resulting from demand picking up after the current crisis will itself damage the 
prospects for sustained recovery. A worst case would be the return of hyper-inflation and 
the need to return to the stringent monetary policies of the 1980s. 
5. The social and political consequences would include long term unemployment, high 
inflation and the devastation of key sectors of the economy.  These would affect different 
regions of the UK to different degrees, threatening the government’s current “levelling up” 
policies and, not least, deepen the sense of “haves” and “have nots” that may lead to social 
unrest.   
6. Cultural changes will include even lower church attendance, and possibly also a decline 
in religiosity amongst minorities of other religions.  Cultural changes will also result from 
the fight for survival of many cultural institutions, including state-sponsored ones, such as 
theatres, orchestras, operas, ballet companies, cinemas, wildlife parks and zoos; many 
will disappear. 
7. Previous strong resistance in some sectors to “virtual” attendance of board meetings, job 
interviews, academic examinations or to distance learning will be overcome. In future this 
is going to be standard procedure, including distance learning for military officers which 
had already existed in some places, but as a minority phenomenon.   
 
Option IV: Abandon all lockdown, return to hope for “herd immunity” 
If all forms of lockdown are abandoned as unaffordable, one woud still keep up self-isolation 
of vulnerable people, but hope for herd immunity (“Putting the economy above lives”). 
Even then, the lockdown since 23 March has already put a big dent in the UK economy and 
many businesses, small and large, will not recover. 
Rates of infection would result in workers and employees in all sectors falling ill, with 
somewhat reduced productivity everywhere.  The NHS would be utterly overwhelmed, large 
numbers of people would be turned away from hospitals, increasing the proportion of mortality 
due to the absence of support with ventilators in the critical phase of their illness.  A substantial 
part of the population as a whole would have the traumatic experience of witnessing the agony 
of loved ones who would normally be expected to receive intensive care; many old people – 
especially those living alone – would, if infected, experience extreme isolation and 
helplessness combined with unmitigated suffering.  It is unlikely that 21st century Europeans 
could stand for this option. 
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EU, USA, Russia, China  
EU 
The same range of options sketched for the UK above must be under consideration presently 
by the governments of all EU member states, even though none has so far publicly articulated 
the option of a series of lockdowns and re-openings.   
What would be the ideal options to embrace for all of the EU?  If Option II (stop and go 
lockdowns) were chosen, extremely close co-ordination would be needed if lockdowns were 
phased to occur at different times in different countries and regions of countries, so that on 
the one hand, supply chains could be organised around such dates to optimise productivity, 
and on the other, so that health services could help each other out across regional and country 
borders.   
As for the UK, Option II would come at a very considerable cost and experts forecast recession 
and worse; the Swedish economist Lars Jonung is speaking of the EU’s “collective economic 
harakiri”.3  The influential independent German Institute for Economic Research (IW) in 
Cologne, for example, assesses the cost of the lockdown in Germany until end April 2020 as 
5% of GDP.  
Initially, all took governments unilateral measures amounting to varying degrees of lockdown, 
without co-ordination by the EU.  Border closures had to exclude the flow of goods as the 
economies of Europe are so very interdependent.  In late March and early April, this was 
decried as indicating the shrinking relevance of the EU, and a potential sign of its future 
demise.  In several countries, especially the worst-affected Italy, anti-EU sentiment has grown 
rapidly.  Italians accuse their partner-countries of abandoning them.  Spain, which was already 
suffering much higher unemployment figures than its northern neighbours, has seen a further 
900 000 lose their jobs since the government enforced lockdown.  While there is no anti-EU 
party in Spain other than the Catalan separatist movement, in Spain, too, as in Greece since 
the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2016, there is a strong feeling that the richer EU members 
are not demonstrating sufficient solidarity.   
It does not bode well for the future of the EU that the European Central Bank declined Italy’s 
request for emergency funding, and that Germany has been unsupportive of the 
“Coronabonds” initiative. The Commission, however, should not be faulted for managing this 
crisis badly, as the co-ordinating of cross-EU responses has so far not been among its 
competences, but logic has little place in political perception.   
This crisis will both be a touchstone for the future importance of the EU and for the re-
nationalisation of politics.  For the moment we continue to see both trends:   
Again without much co-ordination, individual governments are announcing an end to 
lockdowns, all espousing some form of Option III with severe restrictions remaining in place, 
and most countries going for a progressive relaxation.  In Austria, Spain and Italy, come 
categories of shops are opening again as they will in Germany from 20 April.  Schools will 
progressively open again in Germany from 4 May, in France from 11 May. .  Unilaterally 
imposed border closures, justified in terms of emergency suspension of the normal state, in 
 
3  Le Monde (10 April 2020). 
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cutting off the flow of seasonal labour across EU borders is greatly troubling agriculture.  
Austria and Germany have resorted to flying in seasonal workers from Eastern European 
countries, and on 13 April, President Macron announced that France’s borders with European 
countries would be re-opened, and Germany is also following suit.   
Purely national measures are proving to be deficient in many areas.  The weaker economies 
are having enormous difficulties getting a grip on the crisis (not to mention, dealing with its 
consequences) on their own and in isolation.  Also any exit strategy from the current lock-
down will have to include the reconstitution of supply chains across state borders, and would 
benefit hugely from central co-ordination from Brussels.  There is thus also some renewed 
enthusiasm on several sides for more EU, not less, and the Commission has on 15 April issued 
guidelines non-compulsory in an effort to co-ordinate measures across the EU.  So far, all 
governments that have announced an end date to lockdown has warned their populations that 
the situation has to be reviewed, but none has come clean of the fact that the espousal of 
Option III – openness in principle with severe restrictions still in place – may very well have to 
yield to one or more further lockdowns (Option II) if reinfection rates cannot be kept low.  
Option II would be infinitely easier to implement if further lockdowns – and transborder co-
operation of the health services – were centrally co-ordinated. Currently it is unclear which of 
these two trends will prevail – that of the re-nationalisation or of new transfers of power and 
competences to the EU.   
In the individual member states of the EU, there are many conflicting tendencies at work. 
Spain, France, Italy and Greece are likely to see the strongest popular resistance to the 
continuation of lockdown measures across the summer, both for simple reasons of climate 
and temperatures, and given a greater scepticism of government authority.  This does not 
mean that restrictions will be respected more eagerly in Eastern Europe unless governments 
embrace more authoritarian approaches as now in Hungary.  Currently, populations are 
psychologically unprepared for restrictive measure not to mention complete lockdown to 
continue beyond 1 May.  There will be general protest in the media and social media if/once 
governments own up to their intentions of imposing further lockdowns.  But once the initial 
shock dies down, many countries will accept this.   
Throughout Europe (including UK and Norway), restrictions are both more necessary and 
more stringently enforced in cities than in rural areas, and concomitantly it is urban populations 
living in cramped conditions without gardens – typical of tenement buildings in most of 
Continental cities – that will most resent having to spend the summer indoors.  Not only 
morbidity and mortality, but also the indirect hardship caused by the crisis which will affect 
different sectors and different countries to different degrees.  In Austria and the Mediterranean 
littoral states, the tourist industries will be dealt perhaps the greatest blow that any one sector 
will suffer.  In all these countries, populism, nationalism, and in Catalonia, separatism will be 
strengthened.  Coupled with unemployment and other losses, this is where popular unrest will 
breed, easily capitalised by populist parties, but as none of these states have general elections 
scheduled in the period up to end 2021, lasting consequences are unlikely to make themselves 
felt before.4   
 
4  General elections are expected in Romania in December 2020, in the Netherlands in March 
2021, in Germany, the Czech Republic and in Bulgaria in late 2021.   
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Most EU countries will emerge from the coming year and a half with economic and fiscal losses 
that will make offers of Chinese investment look tempting; China has already for some time 
targeted countries like Greece, Italy and Hungary.  Chinese influence, especially on the more 
vulnerable among the European economies, will grow as the US is retreating.  
Some of the Scandinavian countries plus Switzerland might emerge unscathed from the crisis, 
but for all the others, there is a big choice to be made in the coming months as to whether to 
attempt closer co-operation with other EU states, or to continue to go it alone. 
 
USA 
The United States has little tradition of government-imposed restrictions, and a strong tradition 
of anti-federalism, self-help and a muscular defence of personal freedoms.  Reports about gun 
sales having risen in numbers may be anecdotal, but clearly there is a cultural perception in 
some parts of the population of a correlation between crisis, restrictions, and danger – not 
primarily the danger of infection but coming from other humans or from government.5  While 
one might suspect that much the same sectors of the electorate voted for Trump as will object 
to restrictions on their personal freedoms, it does not necessarily follow that they would vote 
for the Democrat candidate in the presidential elections in November 2020.   
The US administration was slow to embrace restrictive measures with predictable 
consequences especially for big cities with tightly-packed populations.  Within a fortnight, 
around ten million Americans have lost their jobs.  Perhaps more stringent measures (on the 
lines of Options II-III) will follow, with their inevitable economic consequences, but even after 
a very short periods of lockdown imposed in several states, there is considerable pressure 
from business and populations to revoke the measures.  If the US economy takes a significant 
down-turn, this will affect the world.   
The Federal Reserve has been willing to take a “whatever it takes” approach to shoring up the 
US economy. At face value, this seems to be in line with President Trump’s “America First” 
approach – support to US businesses, support for employment and near zero interest rates. 
What has relieved financial markets, however, is the swift action to include swap rates in the 
interest rate policy – in other words ensuring that the US’s export partners can borrow in dollars 
at the same rate as US businesses. This has strengthened the US dollar and effectively 
reinforces its hegemony in global financial markets and global trade. Prior to the Covid-19 
pandemic, we were talking of the weaponisation of trade, technology and financial markets; 
the actions of the Fed suggest that the US dollar remains part of any broader strategy. 
Meanwhile, President Trump sees his country engaged in a zero-sum struggle for world 
leadership with China, while the interest he shows in other parts of the world is much reduced. 
It will be more difficult for any US President to justify the disproportionally high levels of US 
defence expenditure, and cut-backs will be difficult to avoid.  This must contribute strongly to 
President Trump’s inclination to shed European and Middle Eastern commitments.  Thomas 
 
5  William Arkin: “The Military's Top Secret Plans If Coronavirus Cripples the Government”, 
Newsweek (18 March 2020) 
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Gomart, director of IFRI, calls the COVID-19 crisis the first of a “post-American world”, given 
that Trump has shown no international leadership whatsoever in it.6   
There is no reason why Donald Trump’s sympathy for the present UK Government would 
wane, nor is there any reason why he would (in an assumed second presidency) make any 
trade concessions to the UK as a gesture of friendship.  Moreover, with Brexit, the UK’s 
position as influencer within the EU that always aimed to keep European and US aims aligned 
has disappeared, and consequently also its influence in NATO has diminished.  His 
relationship with the UK, as with the rest of the world, will remain transactional.   
 
Russia 
Russia is still at an early stage of the pandemic, although as of 10 April the number of cases 
exceeded 10 thousand. While Vladimir Putin had overly optimistically claimed on 17 March 
that the situation was under control, numbers of cases have since increased and Putin was 
forced to impose a lock-down (“non-working days”) on 25 March, to last until the end of April. 
Even in the big cities, much of the public continues to ignore the official guidelines. Putin has 
delegated responsibility for the implementation (but not necessarily resources to cope with 
the crisis) to regional governments. This has been widely interpreted as Putin’s attempt to 
shed responsibility and blame governors in case of the pandemic’s mismanagement.  
Regions are taking divergent approaches: Chechnya has completely locked regional 
borders, going against the federal regulations, while e.g. Krasnodar region has hardly 
implemented any restrictions at all. The opposition, especially Alexei Navalny, criticises the 
government’s approach in social media, but the restrictions introduced, e.g. in Moscow, 
make it impossible to organise any protests.   
Putin is using the COVID-19 to try to enforce more economic policy reforms at a time when it 
is difficult for the elite to resist them. Various bankruptcy reforms and populist stimuli 
alongside measures to impose harsher penalties for the elite moving their money offshore 
are being implemented. Generally, Putin tries to keep a soft touch on these policies since 
cracking down on the elite may win him popularity but generally convinces the rich to move 
more money offshore. 
These measures are being coordinated through the new prime minister (the former tax 
director) and the Ministry of Economic Development. Putin himself is using the pandemic to 
show his leadership as defender of employees, threatening punishment for any employer 
who dismisses them.  But the private sector is already suffering from the lockdown and it is 
not clear whether businesses (particularly small business) would be able or willing to 
observe the lockdown should it be extended beyond the end of April.  30% of business 
owners have sent their employees on unpaid leave, and that this will grow to 50% by mid-
April. There are no social safety nets in place, and few Russians have savings. The 
government has promised to pay out salaries, but the promise seem to have only extended 
to government employees.  Russia can at best bring its government reserves of 12.8 trillion 
roubles, roughly 11.4 % of GDP, to this economic emergency.  Public discontent with the 
regime will grow when millions are left unemployed.  
 
6  Le Monde (9 April 2020) 
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For all Russians bar the very richest, publicly available health care is poor.  Russian leaders 
could either be tempted to lift restrictions and count on herd immunity, while simultaneously 
seeking to conceal as much as possible the actual Covid-19 infection/death rates. (Russian 
social media are already full of conspiracy theories claiming that Covid-19 has been raging 
already in some regions for more than a month with thousands of people dead; all of which 
covered up by the Kremlin.)  Or the Kremlin might try to use authoritarian lockdown 
measures to enforce Options II or III, risking devastating economic effects. 
In the short-term, Covid-19 has created obstacles to moves that were to boost Putin’s 
popularity and keep him in power: special 9 May celebrations of the WW2 victory 75 years 
ago with foreign VIPs like Macron attending, and the voting scheduled for 22 April concerning 
the amendments to the constitution that would allow Putin to remain in power by 2036. Even 
if the victory parade takes place (e.g. without spectators), its domestic morale-boosting and 
foreign propaganda effects will be much reduced. The amendments to the constitution can 
take effect without a public vote of approval (the formal procedure of constitutional revisions 
is complete); it is uncertain, however, if the Kremlin would be willing to take the risk of a 
backlash and push through the constitutional change during the pandemic. 
Also in the short term, it has pushed Putin into a more conciliatory approach in foreign 
economic policy.  Attempts to project soft power by sending medical supplies to Europe have 
backfired when their poor quality became apparent.  More important is the change in oil 
politics. In March, Moscow withdrew from OPEC+ as it disagreed with El-Riyadh on the 
division of cuts; domestic producers strongly pushed for the withdrawal. But on 9 April the 
Kremlin agreed to serious cuts to the oil production with Saudi Arabia and re-joined the OPEC+ 
agreement, even though it is in Russia’s interest to drive the price up again.  Oil companies 
now probably face higher taxes that would compensate for a lower level of oil production. 
Russia still has financial reserves (both in the National Welfare Fund and in the Central Bank) 
as a safety net for the coming months. A higher oil price – for which some revival of the world 
economy is necessary – would help to keep these reserves at a level allowing for supporting 
the society and Russian business. 
For the military, the message that is put out is that ”everything is normal”.  The 1 April - 1 July 
spring draft, this year involving sending 135,000 young Russians (highest number in a while) 
to garrisons across the country, is still scheduled, but postponed until after 20 May. Russia is 
so far not cancelling military exercises (such as the very large exercise of the Pacific Fleet) 
and at the time of writing is still planning to go ahead with the 9 May VE-Day parade.  For now, 
this hardly affects the fighting power of Russia’s Armed Forces, but in any scenarios with 
recurring waves of Covid-19 and lockdowns, conscription as a manning tool will be more 
cumbersome. 
There is a small chance that Russia would exploit the current situation for any military action 
abroad (or punitive actions against Chechnya for illegally closing its borders as a region of the 
Russian Federation), but we think it unlikely.   
 
China 
In China, there is a tension between the fears of the second wave of pandemic and the 
willingness to capitalise on its to-date success. The economic revival is the top priority of the 
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leadership. Although the re-opening of Wuhan on 8 April was intended to symbolize China’s 
victory over the virus, it seems unlikely that the quarantine of the entire city, three month 
lockdown throughout China, aggressive testing and quarantine measures for individuals, and 
the universal introduction of other public health measures such as wearing masks and using 
phone apps to track and trace infections have done anything more than contain the virus. 
Further outbreaks and a phased series of lockdowns (Option II) are likely to continue, or else, 
with surveillance far exceeding that which has been introduced in Europe or America during 
the current lockdown, partial lockdowns (more like Option III), targeted at particular 
provinces/cities where the virus returns. Coupled with digital surveillance measures, China’s 
authoritarian structure is probably able to make such a policy relatively successful. 
The economic harm already done is considerable, and the most vulnerable sections of the 
population, such as migrant workers, the rural poor and the elderly have suffered the most 
and could present a risk to stability if their needs are not addressed. Therefore, we can expect 
renewed efforts by the Chinese state to redistribute wealth using the existing or newly 
designed social welfare systems. 
As always, the regime will make social and political stability an overriding priority. Careful 
management of the news and manipulation of public opinion within China and, to the extent 
possible, overseas will be central to its efforts.  Speculation about the true extent of epidemic 
in China has emerged based on reports about the number of cremations in Wuhan and also 
estimates of the number of journeys out of Wuhan before the lockdown was introduced.  
Compared with other countries which had more time to prepare, smaller populations, and 
lower population density, China’s official death toll of 3326 by the time the day of National 
Mourning was held on 4 April seems improbable, but China will treat it as a national security 
issue to make sure that its narrative of victory over the virus is maintained.   
Chinese society has changed as a result of the epidemic. During the height of the first 
outbreak, there were reports of communities literally barricading themselves in. While the 
regime is unlikely to tolerate any kind of unofficial quarantine measures, Chinese society has 
probably over these three months become less trusting and more fearful. Some of this fear 
has begun to transform into xenophobia, particularly after the government started to announce 
that new infections were coming from outside China and to cover the course of the epidemic 
overseas on TV news, mostly without embellishment. Although the Chinese government has 
called on its citizens to treat foreigners equally with Chinese citizens in all matters concerning 
quarantine and control, regime propaganda is continuously recreating the image of a safe, 
controlled China and an unsafe situation abroad, and this is likely to affect how foreigners are 
received and influence Chinese attitudes to foreign travel. 
Political repression has intensified as a result of the outbreak. Xi Jinping’s original intention on 
coming to power seems to have been to create a more centralised, more controlled and less 
pluralised Chinese regime than the one the West became used to in the 1990s and first decade 
of the 2000s. The virus offers new opportunities to increase surveillance, notably through the 
now universal use of QR code apps which are ostensibly to identify contacts of covid-19 
infections but can be easily repurposed to identify carriers of ‘ideological viruses.’ This was 
already being done in Xinjiang province to cope with a perceived tendency towards separatism  
there.  A less vibrant civil society and fewer social and economic spaces outside of direct 
government control seem to be likely side effects of the epidemic. 
 16 15 IV 2020 
 
________________________________________ 
Coriolis Technologies: CEO Dr Rebecca Harding 
University of Glasgow Ad Hoc Response Group:  
Professor Beatrice Heuser (PI). 
In terms of China’s global economic position, the pandemic is a huge set back, albeit perhaps 
not as great as for Europe and North America, let alone the developing countries. As an effect 
of the COVID-19 crisis, some of its markets are drying up. Yet China’s growth rate was slowing 
before the virus hit.  This was probably not a result of the 2008 financial crisis, as China was 
relatively isolated from its effects as not exposed to sub-prime lending.  More of a deliberate 
policy, it shifted from an emphasis on economic growth to exporting its economic model in the 
context of the Belt-and-Road initiative.  GDP growth rates in China are set as national targets, 
with local government spending on infrastructure projects being the “go to” means of 
generating growth. It is in this context that China’s leading economists are debating whether 
or not it is better to revise the current six per cent GDP growth target down to a more realistic 
three per cent (see here), or to reach for the stimulus levers again to try to achieve the original 
targets. 
In terms of foreign policy, China is likely to continue its global PR campaign that portrays China 
as a leader in fighting against Covid-19 and attempts to compensate for losses to China’s 
image caused by its early-stage mismanagement of the issue. China is likely to continue 
emphasising the value of its experience in tackling COVID-19, its willingness to help other 
countries materially and the importance of a multilateral, joined up approach. At the same 
time, it will react furiously to any questioning of its narrative of successful, calm management 
of the virus, and it will resist attempts by the US to weaken the WHO and any other UN bodies 
which the US perceives as being in China’s pocket.  
US-China relations could deteriorate further if the US continues to criticise China’s responses. 
Beijing will be eager to juxtapose its efficiency with the US domestic failures and the lack of 
international leadership.  
If the US continues to lose interest in multilateral solutions to global problems, China is likely 
to do likewise, without signalling to the world that this is the case. China will continue to pursue 
what it saw as its upward trajectory in world affairs, to focus on securing key resources through 
the cultivation of ties with developing countries, its Belt-and-Road Initiative, to robustly defend 
its sphere of influence in East Asia, and to pursue reunification with Taiwan. China can be 
expected to take advantage of any weakening of the EU by strengthening bilateral ties and 
making strategic investments in distressed countries of Europe.  
In the near future, any foreign ‘adventurism’ on the part of China is implausible. Its potential to 
draw away the attention of the society is limited and it might harm the economy, the revival of 
which is the most important at the moment.   
 
General 
The policies espoused in Europe, the USA, Japan, Australia, China, Russia will have a 
considerable impact on the developing economies.  The extreme lock-down in most of Europe 
leads to a very considerable reduction in the consumption of non-vital goods produced in low-
wage developing economies.  Also, in normal times most tourists come from these richer 
countries, and their absence is already devastating the tourist industries throughout the world, 
again with the worst socio-economic effects on countries without unemployment protection 
schemes. 
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Africa, Middle East, India, other regions 
Even after only a few weeks of lockdown, global government debts will skyrocket in developing 
economies – preliminary estimates already suggest that government debt as a share of GDP 
globally could rise to anything between 15 and 20%.  The economic consequences of the lock 
down effected in India etc might necessitate a global rescue scheme like that of the Marshall 
Plan – only global.  The role of the IMF and WTO will change as a result of Coronavirus, 
probably just after the time frame considered here.  The implications of this for relationships 
between the richer and the emerging economies is that the latter will desperately need help, 
from concrete medical support to debt relief on a potentially unprecedented scale, from the 
former. 
Africa is the last continent to face an outbreak of COV-19. More than 30 of 47 countries are 
reporting infections. While most now have testing capacity, the rates of infection are likely 
much higher than currently known due to population density in major cities and lack of mass 
testing. While some countries have imposed travel bans and closed schools (Liberia for 
example did so already on 16 March), social distancing and isolation will remain a challenge 
since many large families live together and work/economic precarity limits citizens’ capacity to 
socially distance since many rely on overcrowded forms of public transit (i.e. hop on hop off 
buses) to get to work. Healthcare systems in Africa have some resilience in terms of dealing 
with a highly contagious and deadly disease due to lessons learned from recent outbreaks of 
Ebola in West Africa and in the DRC. However, focusing all public health resources on COVID-
19 means that other more sustained health emergencies, like malnutrition and the outbreak of 
diseases like measles, will be put on the backburner. The combined stress on some countries 
will be such that external support will be needed in the form of personal protection equipment, 
medical staff, testing kits, and ICU equipment/beds.  
The global financial downturn will also have an impact on African countries’ economic 
resilience as this crisis unfolds. The continent’s key trading partners, besides its own states, 
are Europe and China. Oil is the largest export sent from North African countries to both 
partners. Therefore, oil economies across the African continent are likely to suffer significantly 
as demand falls. The continent also provides many raw materials used for manufacturing in 
both regions, and demand in those sectors have also taken a downturn. Other African 
countries that primarily export a specific good (ie coffee from Ethiopia, cocoa from Cote 
d’Ivoire) will also suffer as global trade declines in the coming months.  
Along with Venezuela, South Sudan and Yemen have been called the countries to most 
vulnerable the imminent Covid-19 outbreak.  The countries around the Horn of Africa have at 
the beginning of 2020 suffered a devastating plague of locusts which have severely reduced 
the expected harvest.  Coming on top of this, in an area east of the Great Lakes that has 
suffered greatly from civil wars in the last decades, this could well lead to new political 
instabilities.  The locusts have affected also the south of the Arab peninsula where war-torn 
Yemen has suffered from famine for the past few years, reaching even into the border-area 
dividing Pakistan and India.  
In India, the pandemic is striking just after months of considerable political unrest in reaction 
to Modi’s nationalism which has a strong Hindu, anti-Muslim flavour.  Early lockdowns to 
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isolate cities have already resulted in great distress for unemployed people sent back to their 
previous domiciles as public transport has ceased up, with thousands on the roads on foot in 
the countryside, threatened by starvation.7  Labourers paid on a daily wages are suffering 
particularly, and in mid-April there have been reports of day-labourer demonstrations. The 
government caused a flutter also for its trading partners when it suspended the export of 
hydroxychloriquin, currently thought to be potentially mitigating the effects of the virus (the 
suspension was lifted on 11 April).8  This small episode underlines the problems of unilateral 
actions by states in an interconnected economy. 
As various industries in developing countries – especially cheap clothes manufacture and 
tourism – will be deeply affected by the lack of demand in the West, the ensuing unemployment 
in these sectors of the garments industry and hospitality affect especially low-income workers 
and will lead quickly to impoverishment against the background of lacking welfare provisions.  
The scale of this will depend strongly on when shops will open and socialising will resume 
again (with renewed demand for clothing) and travel bans will be lifted in Europe, the USA and 
Australia. 
Sub-Saharan African and Indian societies are still more used to great poverty, infant mortality 
and lower life expectancies among sectors of their societies, as well as to lingering diseases 
as malaria or Aids.  Nevertheless, against the background of political tensions predating the 
crisis, its poor handling by governments can trigger major political unrest in a number of 
countries.  Stalled economies and the social upheaval of a major public health emergency 
may also encourage armed insurgencies in countries that have suffered from protracted 
conflict. Armed groups may capitalize on governments’ distraction to take land and resources, 
attack government and allied forces in areas of weak security, or raid more remote civilian 
settlements. Such insurgencies and cross border armed activity may destabilize regional 
security and threaten fragile gains in countries looking to transition away from the precarity of 
conflict to stability and long term peace. 
As and when a vaccine becomes available, it is to be hoped for the sake of all these 
disadvantaged populations that an equitable way of distributing it can be found, and that the 
richer and more powerful countries will not buy up stocks of vaccines as they have done with 
face masks in recent days.   
 
Conclusions 
Whether the current crisis will “merely” accelerate trends that were previously ongoing 
anyway, or whether it will change the world as we know it depends on the time it will take to 
find a pharmaceutical solution.  A lockdown of one to three months suspends habits and 
procedures; a return to pre-crisis behaviour would be expected afterwards.  By contrast, a 
lockdown or a series of lockdowns or very stringent social distancing measures that last a year 
or longer replace previous norms with new habits and procedures, and a return to pre-crisis 
behaviour is not the default but would need a collective agreement that this is desirable, and 
 
7  Arundhati Roy: “The pandemic is a portal”, The Financial Times (3 April 2020) 
8  Le Monde (12-14 April 2020) 
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an effort to make the changes.  This crisis is likely both to accelerate and strongly increase 
trends and to catalyse developments that might otherwise not have become preponderant.   
Any route out of the current lockdown will depend on the UK government’s appetite for 
“Whatever it takes” actually to mean just it.  These are unprecedented times and our actions 
will be determined, not just by our willingness to spend our way out of the crisis and impose 
additional controls on individuals (such as testing and technological control over social 
distancing and contacts as seen in South Korea). Rather, the impact of our actions will also 
be determined by the fact that, unlike other countries in the world, the UK is about to embark 
on an independent trade and security relationship with Europe that means many of its 
economic and political relationships with the rest of the world will also change. The UK is an 
open economy dependent on these trade relationships and our Coronavirus exit strategy has 
to be seen in this context.  
The global setting in which governments have to manage the crisis will deteriorate greatly 
within the period considered.  China and the USA will continue their unfruitfully-framed struggle 
for world leadership, and India is displaying nationalism and religious intolerance.  Along with 
the developing countries it will experience catastrophic consequences, a largely unmitigated 
spread of the disease, extreme impoverishment of the unemployed and their families in the 
absence of social safety nets as whole sectors of their economy are starved of demand.  
Millions from Africa, the Middle East and Latin America will try to flee this misery, heading 
North.  Despite the drastic consequences that this crisis will have for Europe and North 
America, this is not where it will cause the greatest hardship.  Indeed, Europeans and 
Americans will have to prepare themselves mentally for the great need the developing world 
will have for their support after the crisis.  Paradoxically, the emergence of these rich regions 
from the crisis with the least damage can help the rest of the world, if the rich are willing to 
share.  Ironically, the lockdown measures have the side effect of a reduction of CO2 emissions, 
but once they are lifted, many countries will default on their promises of investment to contain 
climate change.   
To repeat, whether reality by the end of 2021 will look somewhat like one the following four 
scenarios depends very much on how the pandemic will develop (mutation of the virus, 
reinfection, …), whether only non-pharmaceutical measures can stem its most catastrophic 
eruption in all or parts of the world, or whether a medical cure of sorts can be found earlier.  
But how governments manage the crisis in the coming 1½ years at this point is still for 
governments to decide.  We think that Future Scenario A would be in the best interest of all, 
Future Scenario C the worst, with Future Scenario B also resulting in poor conditions for post-
COVID-19 recovery. 
 
Future Scenario A: UK in co-ordination with EU countries adopts Option II or 
Option III 
The recession is unlikely to be a sharp downturn followed by rapid recovery (V-shaped) and 
the speed at which global trade and demand pick up will be an important feature of the need 
for UK measures to be continued.  Much depends on whether EU markets, our major export 
destinations at present, recover sufficiently to pull the UK out of its own recession quickly, and 
whether the reconstitution of supply chains can be worked out in tandem with the countries 
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into which these tap.  Re. Option II, optimal solutions would only be found if all EU countries 
plus the UK co-ordinated rhythms of lockdown and closure very closely and industry and other 
business could plan in great detail and well in advance how to restart supply chains and keep 
them going.  This would require a departure on all sides from the purely national decision-
making which has prevailed so far. 
Co-operation of this sort would not necessarily have to entail opening borders to labour 
migration or tourism.  For the UK (bar its tourist industry, some agricultural sectors, and tertiary 
education sector), this would be a win-win situation.   
All reliance on supplies from developing economies carries with it the risk of being affected by 
the COVID-19 even more heavily than Europe and by ensuing political unrest.  The knock-on 
effects on Europe would be economic and, in areas close to Europe, migratory and political. 
Substituting close economic relations with USA and/or China equally ties the UK to potential 
political and economic instability (USA) and other dependencies (China).  
Both Options II and III will require the government to maintain and extend its current level of 
support to the UK economy for longer than the three months currently expected with a taper 
as individuals return to work and are furloughed on an intermittent basis. If the total cost of the 
current employment and self-employment support packages ends up at around £110bn (or 
5% of GDP)  for three months, then any extension, say over a longer period to the end of 
August 2020, would eat further into government borrowing to around 10% of GDP.   
The core advantage of this approach lies in its international coordination. It means that 
differential recovery rates in the UK and EU can have “pull” effects on demand in neighbouring 
economies while the risks of re-infection prior to a vaccine being delivered are minimalised. 
This course of action would optimise chances for the UK and other European economies to 
resist negative effects of unpredictable developments in the USA, China, and India, and to 
have the economic resilience, despite great national debts to emerge strong enough to be 
able to help developing countries. 
 
Future Scenario B: UK and EU take different courses of action (Option II and 
Option III).   
A stop-go approach (Option II) to our knowledge is not openly discussed by any EU member 
state except as a fall-back if Option III (no lock-down but heavy restrictions) leads to a 
catastrophic surge of new infections.  But either Option II or Option III requires extensive co-
ordination within EU.   
Any sustained economic stimulus will be similar in terms of its impact on government 
borrowing under any scenario – the impact of taking a different approach to other countries 
will depend on the speed at which the economy can recover.  Divergent approaches to 
releasing the lockdown brings with it import and export log-jams, and getting back to smooth-
flowing trade in both directions will take months if not more than a year.  With resuming trade 
and travel, re-infection is the biggest threat to a long term move away from the current global 
lock down. For the UK government, a stop-go approach has some attractions in that it allows 
the economy to return to normal temporarily – the hope would be that the peaks and troughs 
that this would create would become less marked over time.  
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However, if the EU remains in some form of lockdown or more gradual return to normal, the 
UK’s exports markets and supply chains will be affected. The UK is highly dependent on the 
EU for its trade (approximately 49% of the UK’s exports are to the EU).  More than this, the 
UK’s largest export sectors, automobiles, engineering and machinery, electronics, 
pharmaceutics and aerospace, are heavily integrated into EU structures.  Above 60% of the 
UK’s trade with the EU is in these five sectors alone. If these supply chains do not pick up 
because demand remains weak in the EU, then the UK’s manufacturing and services base 
will suffer as a result.   
This course of action would accelerate the breaking of economic links between post-Brexit 
Britain and the EU, but the short-term economic costs of doing so would exacerbate the costs 
of Brexit.  If the UK chose Option II, it is unlikely that the US or other trading partners further 
afield would want to work closely in the short term with UK businesses subject to periodic 
closures, and they would not vie to replace EU trading partners quickly.   
If the UK chose Option III without any co-ordination with the EU countries, and other trading 
partners like the USA, Canada, Australia, India or the Asian Tigers (Taiwan, Singapore, South 
Korea) and Japan might step in, the cost and time it would take for all the required links to be 
forged to replace those currently still existing with Europe should not be underestimated.  The 
gravity model predicts that distances continue to be crucial obstacles to trade.  China would 
be happy to take advantage of opportunities for collaboration and joint productions.  Tying the 
UK more closely to any of these economies would also mean making it vulnerable to spill-
overs of detrimental effects of the COVID-19 crisis on their economies.   
 
Future Scenario C: Unco-ordinated national decision-making and measures 
continue. 
In this scenario, France and Germany cannot agree on a joint leadership role, Macron’s 
attempts to take the lead fail.  The UK is not a player in the EU and thus cannot influence EU 
member states.  
Any uncoordinated action runs political and economic risks. There are signs that there are 
tensions within the EU about rescue packages that extend to a full “transfer union” with full 
and shared responsibility for the recovery packages. This is essentially the concern of “thrifty” 
economies like Germany and the Netherlands who have struggled with austerity and are 
reluctant to see their surpluses used to support more profligate nations and is an argument 
that has prevented full monetary union across the Eurozone.  
So far, every nation within Europe has taken its own fiscal measures, outside of the Maastricht 
constraints for government borrowing – even Germany has taken off its automatic fiscal 
stabilisers in order to deal with the crisis. Germany is, however, better placed to weather the 
financial storm because of its budget surplus prior to the crisis. The post-crisis challenge within 
Europe will be that the relative borrowing of weaker nations, particularly Italy and Spain, will 
be proportionately higher than the stronger nations such as Germany.  This could put undue 
pressure on the euro exacerbating the imbalances within the eurozone.  If this scenario came 
about, it could usher in the demise of the EU in all but name, and a return of Europe to a 
configuration of politically unstable countries with high unemployment and great financial 
problems, and politically more stable status quo powers, living cheek by jowl.  Historically, this 
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has not been a configuration favourable to peace and security.  Moreover, this scenario would 
leave many small and medium-sized countries attempting to fend for themselves entirely 
vulnerable to the global trends and competing forces that will be unleashed as the longer-term 
economic, social and political effects of the COVID-19 crisis. 
